I have been blogging about the path to a health reform deal that I offer in my book: universal catastrophic coverage implemented via Medicare. Martin Feldstein, chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Reagan, offered a universal catastrophic coverage proposal in October, 2009, that would:
- provide tax credits to purchase a catastrophic private health insurance policy, with catastrophic defined as costs above 15% of income (financed by ending the tax exclusion of employer paid insurance; people could purchase additional coverage with after tax dollars)
- issue each person/family a “health care credit card” that could be used to purchase care in the deductible amount
A few quick comments about Prof. Feldstein’s proposal and how it compares to mine.
- Defining catastrophic as a percentage of income makes conceptual sense, but introduces some technical challenges. All of the issues related to timing, what happens if your income changes, and perverse incentives related to loss of subsidy if your income increases that have been raised with respect to the income-based subsidies in the ACA apply to Prof. Feldstein’s proposal as well (and to just about any public policy that provides a differential government expenditure/subsidy based on income).
- Prof. Feldstein’s proposal provides a guaranteed means of financing needed care if someone makes a bad choice in choosing catastrophic coverage only, while mine does not. A huge concern under my proposal is what will persons who choose to only have catastrophic insurance, but who get sick, actually do? Will some avoid the care they need? If so, this will likely increase the catastrophic costs that Medicare will incur down the road if they spend through the catastrophic coverage amount.
Continue reading “Taylor v. Feldstein: Comparing Catastrophic Plans”